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The goal of this study is to ask whether investors learn differently from gains (pos-
itive news) versus losses (negative news), whether learning performance is better or
worse when people are actively investing in a security or passively observing the se-
curity’s payoffs, and whether there are personal characteristics that correlate with
learning performance. The experimental evidence documented here indicates that the
ability to learn from financial information is on average worse in the loss domain, in
particular if the investor has personally experienced the prior outcomes of the financial
asset considered. Within-individual, learning from gains versus losses, or during active
versus passive involvement, are not perfectly correlated, indicating that there exists
heterogeneity across people with respect to the type of financial information or context
to which they are the most sensitive. Learning performance is determined by acquired
financial expertise as well as by genetic factors related to memory and cognitive control.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines whether investors’ ability to learn in financial markets depends on the
context and type of information received. Specifically, do people learn differently from gains
or positive news, relative to losses or negative news? Does learning performance depend on
whether the individual is actively investing in a security, or passively observing the security’s
payoffs? Finally, are there personal characteristics, either acquired or innate, that predict
learning performance?
The idea that learning may be different in the gain and loss domains is different from and
complementary to the well-documented phenomenon of loss-aversion suggested by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), whereby the disutility of losing an amount of money is greater, in
absolute terms, than the utility of winning that amount. A large body of work has provided
ample evidence for this difference in preferences in the gain and loss domain.1 Nonetheless,
recent findings in the neuroeconomics literature suggest that gains and losses are different
not only in terms of how they shape the value function, but also, in terms of how they are
incorporated in the formation of beliefs.
Specifically, information regarding gains (or positive surprises) and information regarding
losses (or negative surprises) is processed by different brain centers important for the genera-
tion of emotional states and reactions (Kuhnen and Knutson (2005), Knutson and Bossaerts
(2007)). Within a person, the sensitivity of these centers to information may be different,
which could lead some individuals to pay more attention to and learn from positive news,
and others to focus more on negative news (Samanez-Larkin et al. (2011)). Furthermore,
high levels of physiological arousal, which characterize powerful emotional states, have a dis-
ruptive effect on memory and cognitive function (Ashby et al. (2002), Mather et al. (2006)),
and arousal levels are higher when losses are possible, relative to gains (Sokol-Hessner et al.
(2009)). This suggests that memory and learning may be better for details related to positive
1In the finance literature, see for example Odean (1998), Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis et al.
(2001).
1
news than for those related to negative news, in line with experimental findings in psychology
(Eppinger et al. (2010), Mather and Schoeke (2011)). Moreover, reducing the intensity of
emotional states, for example by taking a broader perspective on financial choices or by low-
ering the financial stakes of decisions, decreases physiological arousal and the sensitivity to
negative outcomes (Sokol-Hessner et al. (2012)), and leads to better choices in experimental
gambles (Charness and Levin (2005)) and to more successful trading in financial markets (Lo
et al. (2005)). Hence, the natural hypothesis suggested by this prior work relating emotion,
brain function and decision making is that investors learn differently in the gain versus the
loss domain, and depending on whether they actively engage in trading or passively observe
asset payoffs.
In this paper I test and confirm this hypothesis in an experimental setting. I find that the
ability to learn from financial information is on average worse in the loss domain, in particular
if the investor has personally experienced the prior outcomes of the financial asset considered.
In such situations, subjective beliefs about asset payoffs are overtly pessimistic. Within-
individual, learning from gains versus losses, or during active versus passive involvement,
are not perfectly correlated, indicating that there exists heterogeneity across people with
respect to the type of financial information or context to which they are the most sensitive.
Moreover, heterogeneity in beliefs is the highest during periods characterized by negative
outcomes. To relate these findings back to the neuroeconomics work that informed the
hypothesis of the paper, I collect genetic data from the participants in the experiment and
show that a specific gene (COMT ) previously linked to memory function and cognition is a
significant driver of the differences in learning performance documented here.
The experimental findings of this paper can help explain several intriguing patterns ob-
served in financial markets. First, empirical work has shown that risk premia rise strongly
after large negative moves in prices. This is consistent with an increase in risk aversion
after negative shocks (Todorov (2010), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), Guiso et al. (2011)),
but in addition can also be driven by traders being overtly pessimistic during bad times, as
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suggested by the experimental results shown here. Second, empirically it has been shown
that during downturns there is more heterogeneity in the actions of financial market partic-
ipants, as indicated by the higher volatility in asset prices (e.g., Schwert (1989), Campbell
et al. (2001)), higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (Barinov (2009)), or by the increased
variation in strategies deployed by mutual fund managers (Kacperczyk et al. (2011)). The
experimental findings presented here suggest that this increase in the heterogeneity of ac-
tions of market participants during bad times (i.e., those characterized by a preponderance
of negative news) may be driven by the increase in the heterogeneity of beliefs of these indi-
viduals during poor market conditions. Third, the result that passive observers learn better
than those actively involved in investing, particularly during periods characterized by many
negative outcomes, suggests that financial planners and advisors add value to investors by
responding more objectively to market outcomes, and thus can help justify the significant
demand for these professionals (Elmerick et al. (2002)).
To investigate whether indeed learning is different depending on the type of information
received, and on the degree of involvement of agents in financial markets, eighty-seven adults
were invited to participate in a study that required the completion of two financial decision
making tasks. In the Active task subjects made sixty decisions to invest in one of two
securities: a risky security (stock) with risky payoffs coming from one of two distributions,
one better than the other in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, and a riskless
security (bond) with a known payoff. After each choice participants provided an estimate of
the probability that the risky security was paying from the better distribution. In the Passive
task subjects were only asked to provide the probability estimate that the risky security was
paying from the better distribution, after observing its payoff in each of sixty trials. In
either task, two types of conditions - Gain or Loss - were possible. In the Gain condition,
the two securities provided positive payoffs only. In the Loss condition, the two securities
provided negative payoffs only. Subjects were paid based on their investment payoffs and the
accuracy of the probability estimates provided. Participants were genotyped with respect
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to the COMT gene, which is known to influence the activity of the prefrontal cortex, a
brain area critical for emotion control during cognitive tasks as well as for the functioning of
working memory (Dickinson and Elvevg (2009)). A particular variant of this gene, referred to
as the COMT Met/Met genotype, has previously been associated with better memory and
cognitive performance relative to the other two genotypes, namely V al/Met and V al/V al
(Frank et al. (2007), Doll et al. (2011)).2
I find that subjects learn significantly better from information about the risky security’s
payoffs in the Gain condition relative to the Loss condition. The errors in the subjective
probability estimates (measured relative to the objective Bayesian posteriors that the stock
is paying from the good distribution) are on average 1.86% lower in the Gain condition
relative to the Loss condition (p < 0.001). The difference in probability estimation errors
between the Gain and Loss conditions is twice as large in the Active task (2.56%) relative to
the Passive task (1.16%), and is largest for high values of the Bayesian posterior. Probability
estimate errors are also significantly lower in the Passive task relative to the Active task,
and this effect is driven by the Loss condition, where errors are 1.76% lower in Passive
trials. In other words, people learn worse from loss information, especially if they actively
invest, and are overtly pessimistic in these circumstances. Also, individuals who err more
when constructing their subjective probability estimates make fewer optimal choices (i.e.,
matching those of a risk-neutral Bayesian-updating agent).
Furthermore, within individual, Gain and Loss learning performance are only partially
correlated (ρ=0.7, p < 0.001), and Active and Passive learning performance are also only
partially correlated (ρ=0.6, p < 0.001), indicating that certain individuals are more sensitive
to information in specific domains (Gain vs. Loss) or investment conditions (Active vs.
2Briefly, the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT ) gene on chromosome 22q11 controls the levels of
neurotransmitter dopamine in the prefrontal cortex. In humans it contains a highly functional and common
variation in its coding sequence in exon 4, namely a substitution of valine (V al) by methionine (Met). This is
an instance of a mutation typically referred to as a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). The more stable
V al allele is associated with greater dopamine degradation and less synaptic dopamine in the prefrontal
cortex than the less stable Met allele. As result, the COMT genotype impacts cognition mediated by this
brain area, specifically executive control and working memory, with the Met allele being generally associated
with better performance. See Dickinson and Elvevg (2009) for a comprehensive review.
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Passive). The heterogeneity across participants with respect to their ability to learn from
financial information, measured as the standard deviation of subjective beliefs, is significantly
higher in the Loss condition (16%) relative to the Gain condition (14%), and during Active
(15%) relative to Passive (14%) trials.
I also identify personal characteristics related to the ability to learn across these contexts.
Financial knowledge – specifically familiarity with basic concepts such as expected returns
and probabilities – helps investors learn better. Gender, age and ethnicity are not signifi-
cantly related to learning performance. However, participants’ genotype with respect to the
COMT gene is a significant predictor of the ability to learn from financial information across
all contexts, with effects similar in magnitude to those of financial knowledge. Specifically,
participants with the COMT Met/Met genotype provide probability estimates that are the
closest to the correct Bayesian values, in line with prior neuroscience findings that show the
positive effect of this particular genetic variant on memory and cognition.3 Importantly, I
also find that financial knowledge and being endowed with the Met/Met genotype lead not
only to more accurate subjective beliefs, but also to choosing the optimal asset more often.
The broad idea that learning may be context-dependent is supported by extant empirical
findings in economics. For example, learning displays salience and recency effects. In the
context of portfolio allocation decisions, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that individuals
who have more recently experienced low stock-market returns are reluctant to invest in
equities and have pessimistic beliefs about future stock returns. Also, people are significantly
more likely to buy insurance against natural catastrophes such as floods or earthquakes
shortly after such events happen, even though the objective probability of their occurrence
does not change (Kunreuther et al. (1978), Palm (1995), Froot (2001)).4 Other learning
biases, such as conservatism and representativeness, can drive anomalous patterns in asset
3This finding provides a microfoundation for the result documented by Cronqvist and Siegel (2012) that
there exists more similarity in the propensity to display investment biases among identical twins, relative to
fraternal twins, suggesting that suboptimal behavior may have a genetic component.
4See Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) for a model of ”local thinking” that is consistent with the observed
importance of salience for belief formation.
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prices such as the under- and over-reaction to news (Barberis et al. (1998)).
Learning in financial markets has been the focus of a small but growing experimental
literature. Kluger and Wyatt (2004) document the existence of heterogeneity across traders
with respect to their ability to learn according to Bayes’ rule, and the impact of this het-
erogeneity on asset prices. Asparouhova et al. (2010) find that investors unable to perform
correct probability computations prefer to hold portfolios with unambiguous returns and do
not directly influence asset prices. Payzan-LeNestour (2010) shows that Bayesian learning is
a reasonably good model for investment decisions in complex settings. Bruguier et al. (2010)
show that the ability to forecast price patterns in financial markets depends on traders’ ca-
pacity to understand others’ intentions (i.e., ”theory of mind”), and not on the ability to
solve abstract mathematical problems. Kogan (2009) and Carlin et al. (forthcoming) show
that strategic considerations influence learning and trading in experimental asset markets.
In addition, there exists a novel body of theoretical work focused on understanding the
role of bounded rationality and non-standard preferences in the formation of beliefs by eco-
nomic agents. The existence of costs in the acquisition of information leads to rational inna-
tention, which can help explain the portfolio holdings of individual investors (Van Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp (2010)), investment strategies of mutual fund managers (Kacperczyk
et al. (2011)), or myopic choices in dynamic search problems (Gabaix et al. (2006)). Sparsity
in the information set of boundedly-rational decision makers can generate observed patterns
in consumption and portfolio choices (Gabaix (2011)). The existence of an anticipatory com-
ponent in agents’ utility function can cause individuals to choose optimistic, but incorrect
priors and act on these when making investment or consumption decisions (Brunnermeier
and Parker (2005), Brunnermeier et al. (2007)). This body of work assumes that individuals
learn according to Bayes’ rule, given a (possibly incorrect) prior belief and (possibly sparse)
new information. The focus of this paper is complementary to this literature, as the evidence
presented here sheds light on the process by which people incorporate newly available infor-
mation into beliefs starting from objective priors, and documents domain-specific departures
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from Bayesian learning.
The novel contribution of this paper, therefore, is to show that the ability to learn from
financial information is different in the gain and the loss domains, depends on whether the
investor has personally experienced the prior outcomes of the financial asset considered, and
is driven by acquired familiarity with financial concepts, as well as by a genetic factor related
to memory and emotion regulation during cognitive tasks.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Setup
Eighty-seven individuals (43% males, mean age 20 years) were recruited at Northwestern
University and participated in the experiment. Table 1 presents the sample summary statis-
tics. Each participant completed two financial decision making tasks, referred to below as
the Active and the Passive Task, during which information about two securities, a stock and
a bond, was presented. Each task included two types of conditions: Gain or Loss. In the
Gain condition, the two securities provided positive payoffs only. The stock payoffs were
+$10 or +$2, while the bond payoff was +$6. In the Loss condition, the two securities
provided negative payoffs only. The stock payoffs were -$10 or -$2, while the bond payoff
was -$6.
In either condition, the stock was either good or bad. If the stock was good, it paid the
high dividend with 70% probability on each trial. If it was bad, it paid the high dividend
with 30% probability in each trial. In the beginning of each block of 6 trials, it was equally
likely that the stock will be good or bad during those trials.
In the Active task participants made sixty decisions to invest in one of the two securities,
the stock or the bond, observed the stock payoff (irrespective of their choice) and then pro-
vided an estimate of the probability that the stock was paying from the better distribution.
Figures 1 and 2 show the time line of a typical trial in the Active task, in the Gain and
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Loss conditions, respectively. In the Passive task participants were only asked to provide the
probability estimate that the stock was paying from the better distribution, after observing
its payoff in each of sixty trials. Figure 3 shows the time line of typical trials in the Passive
task, in either the Gain or the Loss conditions.
In the Active task participants were paid based on their investment payoffs and the
accuracy of the probability estimates provided. Specifically, they received one tenth of
accumulated dividends, plus ten cents for each probability estimate within 5% of the objective
Bayesian value. In the Passive task, participants were paid based solely on the accuracy of
the probability estimates provided, by receiving ten cents for each estimate within 5% of
the correct value. Information regarding the accuracy of each subject’s probability estimates
and the corresponding payment was only provided at the end of each of the two tasks.
This information was presented to participants at the beginning of the experiment, and is
summarized in the participant instructions sheet included in the Appendix. The experiment
lasted 1.5 hours and the average payment per person was $30.48.
For each participant we also obtained a measure of their financial literacy, since the
prior literature has documented a positive correlation between this personal characteristic
and successful financial outcomes (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell (2007)). To measure general
finance knowledge, each participant was asked the following questions after the completion
of the experimental tasks: ”Imagine you have saved $10,000. You can now invest this money
over the next year using two investment options: a U.S. stock index mutual fund which tracks
the performance of the U.S. stock market, and a savings account. The annual return per
dollar invested in the stock index fund will be either +40% or -20%, with equal probability.
In other words, it is equally likely that for each dollar you invest in the stock market, at the
end of the one year investment period, you will have either gained 40 cents, or lost 20 cents.
For the savings account, the known and certain rate of return for a one year investment is
5%. In other words, for each dollar you put in the savings account today, for sure you will
gain 5 cents at the end of the one year investment period. We assume that whatever amount
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you do not invest in stocks will be invested in the savings account and will earn the risk
free rate of return. Given this information, how much of the $10,000 will you invest in the
U.S. stock index fund? Choose an answer that you would be comfortable with if this was a
real-life investment decision. The answer should be a number between $0 and $10,000.”
After each participant wrote their answer to this question, they were asked the following:
”Let’s say that when you answered the prior question you decided to invest x dollars out
of the $10,000 amount in the U.S. stock index fund, and therefore you put (10, 000 − x)
dollars in the savings account. Recall that over the next year the rate of return on the stock
index fund will be +40% or -20%, with equal probability. For the savings account, the rate
of return is 5% for sure. What is the amount of money you expect to have at the end of
this one year investment period? Please choose one of the answers below. If you choose the
correct answer, you will get a $5 bonus added to your pay for this experiment. [A]. 0.5 (0.4
x - 0.2 x) + 0.05 (10,000 - x); [B]. 1.4 x + 0.8 x + 1.05 (10,000 - x); [C]. 0.4 (10,000 - x) -
0.2 (10,000 - x) + 0.05 x; [D]. 0.5 [ 0.4 (10,000 - x) - 0.2 (10,000 - x)] + 0.05 x; [E]. 0.4 x -
0.2 x + 0.05 (10,000 - x); [F]. 0.5 (1.4 x + 0.8 x) + 1.05 (10,000 - x); [G]. 1.4 (10,000 - x) +
0.8 (10,000 - x) + 1.05 x; [H]. 0.5 [ 1.4 (10,000 - x) + 0.8 (10,000 - x)] + 1.05 x.”
The correct answer to this question is [F]. The actual choices (if other than [F]) made
by participants indicate three different types of errors that can occur when calculating the
expected value of their portfolio holdings: the lack of understanding of statements regarding
probabilities (answers [B], [C], [E], [G]); the lack of understanding of the difference between
net and gross returns (answers [A],[C], [D] and [E]); and confusing the stock versus risk-free
asset investments (answers [C], [D], [G] and [H]). Therefore, a financial knowledge score
varying between zero and three can be constructed, based on the number of different types
of errors contained in the answer provided by each participant (i.e., zero errors for answer
[F], one error for answers [A], [B] and [H], two errors for answers [D], [E] and [G], and three
for answer [C]). Hence a financial knowledge score of 3 indicates a perfect answer, while a
score of 0 indicates that the participant’s answer included all three possible types of errors.
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Of the 87 participants, 45 made no errors, 24 made one type of error only, 17 made two
types of errors, and 1 person made all three possible types of errors.
2.2 Genotyping
Genotyping was performed by ACGT Inc. (Wheeling, IL), a commercial provider of DNA
analysis services, according to standard procedures described elsewhere (e.g., Frank et al.
(2007)). The resulting distribution of COMT genotypes (summarized in Table 1) of the
87 participants comprised 19 Met/Met, 34 Val/Met and 34 Val/Val participants and was
consistent with that expected under Hardy Weinberg equilibrium (χ2 = 3.29, df = 1, p >
0.05). The sample size in this study is similar (in fact, slightly larger) than those of other
studies targeting the COMT gene, and the incidence of the Met/Met genotype (22%) is
also in line with prior work (e.g., 28% out of 68 participants in Frank et al. (2007), 18% out
of 74 participants in Doll et al. (2011)). Hence, the participant group used in this study is
representative and large enough for identifying the effect of the COMT gene on financial
decision making.
3 Results
3.1 Probability estimation errors across domains
The data show that there exist asymmetries in learning across domains, as indicated by the
results in Figure 4 and in the regression models in Table 2. The figure plots subjective prob-
ability estimates (averaged across all 87 participants) as a function of the objective Bayesian
posterior probabilities that the stock was paying from the better dividend distribution. If
people learn from dividends exactly in accordance with Bayes’ rule, the subjective estimates
and objective probabilities would line up perfectly. However, this is not the case in the data.
I find that individuals learn significantly better from information about the risky secu-
rity’s payoffs in the Gain condition relative to the Loss condition. This can be seen by
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comparing the left two panels in Figure 4, which refer to trials in the Active and Gain, and
Passive and Gain conditions, with the right two panels, which refer to trials in the Active and
Loss, and Passive and Loss conditions. On average, as documented in Table 2, the errors in
the subjective probability estimates (measured relative to the objective Bayesian posteriors
that the stock is paying from the good distribution) are 1.86% lower in the Gain condition
relative to the Loss condition (p < 0.001). The difference in probability estimation errors
between the Gain and Loss conditions is twice as large in the Active task (2.56%) relative
to the Passive task (1.16%). In general, probability estimate errors are lower by 1.06% in
the Passive task relative to the Active task (p < 0.1). This effect is driven by choices in the
Loss condition only, where there errors are lower by 1.76% in Passive versus Active trials
(p < 0.05).
Furthermore, Figure 4 shows that the worst learning overall happens in the Loss condition
in particular when the objective probability that the stock pays from the better (but still with
negative support) distribution is high. In those situations, participants’ subjective posterior
probabilities are the most pessimistic relative to the objective values. Comparing the first
and last columns in Table 2 illustrates this effect. Specifically, while on average the absolute
value of probability estimation errors is 1.86% higher in the Loss condition trials relative to
other trials, this difference increases to 4.31% for Loss trials with high values (≥ 50%) of the
objective posterior probability that the stock pays dividends from the better distribution.
In other words, the data show that when faced with a sequence of mildly negative news (i.e.,
when the stock is bad, but likely not the worst possible), people are overtly pessimistic.
In general, as seen in Figure 4, across Active/Passive and Gain/Loss trials, subjects up-
date their priors in such a way that the expressed posterior probabilities that the stock is
paying from the good distribution is significantly higher (by 12% on average) than the ob-
jective Bayesian posterior for low values of this objective probability, and significantly lower
(by 13% on average) than the objective Bayesian posterior for high values of this objective
probability, a result which replicates the experimental patterns documented in Kuhnen and
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Knutson (2011). This relationship between subjective and objective posterior beliefs re-
sembles the relationship between decision weights and objective probabilities postulated by
Prospect Theory (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Prelec (1998)), but it refers to errors
in updating priors, and not to people’s tendency to overweight rare events and underweight
frequent ones. Note that either type of mistake – updating errors or the use of decision
weights – can help explain people’s focus on small probability events (as indicated by their
willingness to buy insurance or lottery tickets, for example).
While these results show that subjective beliefs are incorrect in some situations, for these
findings to matter it has to be the case that these subjective beliefs actually drive choices.
Ultimately, therefore, it is necessary to show that more incorrect subjective probability
estimates lead to more suboptimal asset choices. Figure 5 shows that this is true in the
data. Specifically, there is a strong and significant (p < 0.001) negative relationship between
the size of probability errors committed by a participant and the number of times they chose
the optimal asset (i.e., the asset that a risk-neutral Bayesian agent would choose given the
available information set). Increasing the average of the probability error by 1% leads to 0.8
fewer optimal choices.5
Moreover, besides acting on their subjective beliefs, individuals do not seem to be aware
that these probability estimates are incorrect, or that they tend to err more in certain types
of trials. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to provide a confidence number
(from 1 to 9, with 1 meaning not confident at all and 9 meaning very confident) to indicate
how much they trust the subjective probability estimate produced in that trial. I find no
significant differences between the average confidence of participants in active versus passive
trials (5.31 vs 5.39, respectively), or during loss versus gain trials (5.27 vs 5.43, respectively).
5Note that each participant is asked to make 60 asset choices. However, for trials where the objective
probability that the stock is paying from the better distribution is exactly 50%, a risk-neutral agent should
be indifferent between choosing the stock or the bond. Hence on such trials it can not be determined whether
the participant behaved optimally, since either choice would seem correct even though it might have been
made for the wrong reason. Hence, I only define optimal choices to be those recorded in trials where the
objective prior is either strictly below or strictly above 50%.
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3.2 Heterogeneity in learning across participants
Aside from these average effects that indicate learning is most problematic in the loss domain
and during active investing, the data also show that there exists a significant degree of
heterogeneity across participants in the accuracy of their probability estimates, and also,
with respect to the context and type of information from which they learn best. Within
individual, Gain and Loss learning performance are only partially correlated (ρ = 0.73,
p < 0.001), and Active and Passive learning performance are also only partially correlated
within person (ρ = 0.57, p < 0.001), as can be seen in Figure 6. These results indicate that
certain individuals are more sensitive to information in specific domains (Gain vs. Loss) or
investment conditions (Active vs. Passive), as also illustrated in Figure 7.
That being said, most people err more in learning in the Loss condition, and during
Active investment, as can be seen in Table 3. Specifically, 57 out of 87 participants display
larger learning errors during the Loss condition, relative to the Gain condition. Also, 54 of
the 87 participants display larger learning errors during Active investment trials, relative to
Passive trials. The most common combination of trial types during which participants make
the biggest probability estimation errors is comprised of Loss & Active trials, with 36 out of
87 subjects (i.e., 41%) being worse learners during this combination of trial types.
Furthermore, I find that the heterogeneity in learning abilities across market participants
is significantly higher in the Loss domain. Specifically, the standard deviation of probability
estimation errors is 13.98% in Gain trials, and 15.86% in Loss trials. A Bartlett’s test rejects
the null hypothesis that the variances of the absolute probability errors in these two samples
are equal (p < 0.001). There also exists more heterogeneity in participants’ learning abilities
during Active trials relative to Passive trials. The standard deviations of absolute values
of probability errors in these two conditions are 15.45% and 14.39%, respectively, and a
Bartlett’s test rejects the null hypothesis that the subsample variances are equal (p < 0.05).
These differences are summarized in Table 4.
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3.3 Predictors of better learning
The results documented above lead to the question of what exactly determines a person’s
ability to learn from financial information across different domains. A likely driver of this
ability is the person’s degree of familiarity with finance concepts, which I measure using the
financial knowledge score given by their answer to the post-experiment portfolio allocation
question described in the Experimental Design section. Indeed, as can be seen in the OLS
regression in the first column of Table 5, financial knowledge is a significant and positive
predictor of accuracy in probability estimates. An increase of one unit in the financial
knowledge score, meaning making one fewer mistakes in the post-experiment portfolio return
calculation, leads to a decrease of 1.83% in the size of the probability estimation error in a
typical trial. The same regression model shows that the participants’ gender, age or ethnicity
do not have significant effects on learning ability.
While it is reassuring, and not surprising, that investors’ acquired knowledge about basic
financial concepts such as expected returns helps them learn better from news in the mar-
ketplace, the relatively low R2 of this OLS model implies that a significant fraction of the
variation in learning across people is driven by other factors, some of which may be innate.
Indeed, as predicted based on prior neuroeconomics work, I document that variation across
people in the ability to learn from and correctly use financial information can be in part
explain by their COMT genotype. Specifically, I find that COMT Met/Met individuals
express probability estimates closest to the correct Bayesian values. For these individuals,
the absolute value of their probability estimation errors is 2.34% lower than for the rest of
the participants, as can be seen in the regression model in the second column of Table 5.
The results shown in columns three to six indicate that the positive effect of the Met/Met
variant on learning is similar in magnitude across active, passive, gain or loss trials. However,
as illustrated by the results in the last column on Table 5, the benefit of being a Met/Met
type is particularly high in conditions where the learning errors displayed by participants in
general are the highest - namely, in loss condition situations where the average participant
14
is overtly pessimistic (i.e., when the probability that the stock is paying from the better
distribution is above 50%). This finding is in line with the hypothesis that the COMT
Met/Met genotype improves the functioning of the prefrontal cortex, a brain area which is
critical for the regulation of emotional states, as well as for working memory and cognitive
control, and this is particularly useful in situations where people are most prone to making
errors.
Importantly, financial knowledge and the COMT genotype of participants drive these
individuals’ subjective beliefs as well as their propensity to select the optimal asset given
the available information (i.e., to choose like a risk-neutral Bayesian agent). Figures 8 and 9
illustrate these effects. Here I use the most conservative analysis approach by averaging the
data at the participant level and working with 87 observations instead of several thousand as
done in the regression models in Table 5. In line with the regression results, Figure 8 shows
that participants with high finance knowledge (i.e., those who made no mistake in answering
the portfolio return question asked after the experimental task) or those endowed with the
COMT Met/Met genotype have lower errors in their probability estimates relative to the
rest of the group. Specifically, average estimation errors are 13.5% in the case of high finance
knowledge participants, and 16.5% for the rest. Estimation errors are on average 13% for
COMT Met/Met individuals and 15.5% for the other types (i.e., V al/V al and V al/Met).
These differences are significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05), and the magnitudes are
similar to those documented in the trial-by-trial regressions in Table 5. Furthermore, pro-
ducing more accurate beliefs helps participants with high finance knowledge or with the
COMT Met/Met genotype to do better in terms of the number of times they select the
optimal asset. Figure 9 shows that the performance with respect to making correct choices
is significantly better (p < 0.05) for high versus low finance knowledge individuals (35.1 vs.
31.2 optimal choices, respectively), and forMet/Met participants versus the others (36.1 vs.
32.5 optimal choices, respectively).
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4 Implications for financial markets
The premise of the experiment presented here, built on recent findings in neuroeconomics,
is that there are differences in how the brain processes information depending on its nature
(i.e., good vs. bad news) or depending on the intensity of the emotional state felt at the
time when new financial information is presented. As a result, learning in financial markets
may have significant context dependence, and therefore it may be beneficial for investors
as well as regulators to be aware of these learning asymmetries. This implication mirrors
the recommendations made by Bossaerts (2009) and Lo (2011), who stress the importance
of affect for financial risk preferences, and propose that transparency and regulation (e.g.,
trading restrictions) can prevent the exacerbation of negative outcomes such as those ob-
served during the financial crises of the past decade. An immediate suggestion based on the
findings documented here is that investors may benefit from delegating their asset choices
to unbiased financial advisors, especially during poor stock market conditions.
Furthermore, besides providing a potential explanation for observed empirical patterns
such as the increase in risk premia, volatility and heterogeneity in actions of market partic-
ipants during bad economic times, the results of this experiment may also be relevant for
future theoretical work. For example, models building on these findings could illustrate the
importance of the presence of imperfect Bayesian learners for the volatility of asset prices,
the informativeness of prices, and the duration of periods where incorrect beliefs about the
future payoffs of assets may cause price deviations from fundamental values.
5 Conclusion
This paper documents the existence of asymmetries in learning in financial markets, de-
pending on the type of information received by investors, and the context faced by these
individuals. Specifically, I find that learning differs in the gain and the loss domain, and that,
on average, it is worse in the loss domain. Learning performance also depends on whether
16
the investor has personally experienced the prior outcomes of the financial asset. On aver-
age, learning is worse during active investing in assets relative to settings where investors
passively observe dividend news. Within-individual, learning in the gain vs. loss domain, or
in the active vs. passive conditions are not perfectly correlated, indicating that there exists
heterogeneity across individuals with respect to the context or type of information to which
they are the most sensitive. Acquired familiarity with basic financial concepts, as well as
innate variation with respect to a particular gene (COMT ) previously linked to memory
and cognitive performance are significant predictors of the investors’ ability to learn from
financial information and make optimal asset choices.
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Appendix: Participant Instructions
Welcome to our financial decision making study!
In this study you will work on two investment tasks. In one task you will repeatedly invest in one
of two securities: a risky security (i.e., a stock with risky payoffs) and a riskless security (i.e., a
bond with a known payoff), and will provide estimates as to how good an investment the risky
security is. In the other task you are only asked to provide estimates as to how good an investment
the risky security is, after observing its payoffs.
In either task, there are two types of conditions you can face: the GAIN and the LOSS conditions.
In the GAIN condition, the two securities will only provide POSITIVE payoffs. In the LOSS con-
dition, the two securities will only provide NEGATIVE payoffs.
Details for the Investment Choice and Investment Evaluation Task:
Specific details for the GAIN condition:
In the GAIN condition, on any trial, if you choose to invest in the bond, you get a payoff of $6 for
sure at the end of the trial. If you choose to invest in the stock, you will receive a dividend which
can be either $10 or $2.
The stock can either be good or bad, and this will determine the likelihood of its dividend being
high or low. If the stock is good then the probability of receiving the $10 dividend is 70% and the
probability of receiving the $2 dividend is 30%. The dividends paid by this stock are independent
from trial to trial, but come from this exact distribution. In other words, once it is determined
by the computer that the stock is good, then on each trial the odds of the dividend being $10 are
70%, and the odds of it being $2 are 30%. If the stock is bad then the probability of receiving the
$10 dividend is 30% and the probability of receiving the $2 dividend is 70%. The dividends paid
by this stock are independent from trial to trial, but come from this exact distribution. In other
words, once it is determined by the computer that the stock is bad, then on each trial the odds of
the dividend being $10 are 30%, and the odds of it being $2 are 70%.
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Specific details for the LOSS condition:
In the LOSS condition, on any trial, if you choose to invest in the bond, you get a payoff of -$6 for
sure at the end of the trial. If you choose to invest in the stock, you will receive a dividend which
can be either -$10 or -$2.
The stock can either be good or bad, and this will determine the likelihood of its dividend being
high or low. If the stock is good then the probability of receiving the -$10 dividend is 30% and the
probability of receiving the -$2 dividend is 70%. The dividends paid by this stock are independent
from trial to trial, but come from this exact distribution. In other words, once it is determined by
the computer that the stock is good, then on each trial the odds of the dividend being -$10 are
30%, and the odds of it being -$2 are 70%. If the stock is bad then the probability of receiving the
-$10 dividend is 70% and the probability of receiving the -$2 dividend is 30%. The dividends paid
by this stock are independent from trial to trial, but come from this exact distribution. In other
words, once it is determined by the computer that the stock is bad, then on each trial the odds of
the dividend being -$10 are 70%, and the odds of it being -$2 are 30%.
In both GAIN and LOSS conditions:
In each condition, at the beginning of each block of 6 trials, you do not know which type of stock
the computer selected for that block. You may be facing the good stock, or the bad stock, with
equal probability.
On each trial in the block you will decide whether you want to invest in the stock for that trial and
accumulate the dividend paid by the stock, or invest in the riskless security and add the known
payoff to your task earnings.
You will then see the dividend paid by the stock, no matter if you chose the stock or the bond.
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After that we will ask you to tell us two things: (1) what you think is the probability that the stock
is the good one (the answer must be a number between 0 and 100 - do not add the % sign, just type
in the value) (2) how much you trust your ability to come up with the correct probability estimate
that the stock is good. In other words, we want to know how confident you are that the probability
you estimated is correct. (answer is between 1 and 9, with 1 meaning you have the lowest amount
of confidence in your estimate, and 9 meaning you have the highest level of confidence in your
ability to come up with the right probability estimate)
There is always an objective, correct, probability that the stock is good, which depends on the
history of dividends paid by the stock already. For instance, at the beginning of each block of
trials, the probability that the stock is good is exactly 50%, and there is no doubt about this value.
As you observe the dividends paid by the stock you will update your belief whether or not the
stock is good. It may be that after a series of good dividends, you think the probability of the
stock being good is 75%. However, how much you trust your ability to calculate this probability
could vary. Sometimes you may not be too confident in the probability estimate you calculated
and some times you may be highly confident in this estimate. For instance, at the very beginning
of each block, the probability of the stock being good is 50% and you should be highly confident in
this number because you are told that the computer just picked at random the type of stock you
will see in the block, and nothing else has happened since then.
Every time you provide us with a probability estimate that is within 5% of the correct value (e.g.
correct probability is 80% and you say 84% , or 75%) we will add 10 cents to your payment for
taking part in this study.
Throughout the task you will be told how much you have accumulated through dividends paid by
the stock or bond you chose up to that point.
Details for the Investment Evaluation Task:
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This task is exactly as the task described above, except for the fact that you will not be making
any investment choices. You will observe the dividends paid by the stock in either the GAIN or the
LOSS conditions, and you will be asked to provide us with your probability estimate that the stock
is good, and your confidence in this estimate. In this task, therefore, your payment only depends
on the accuracy of your probability estimates.
You final pay for completing the investment tasks will be:
$23 + 1/10 * Investment Payoffs + 1/10 * Number of accurate probability estimates,
where Investment Payoffs = Dividends of securities you chose in the experiment, in both the GAIN
and the LOSS conditions.
Please note: cell phones must be off. No drinks, food or chewing gum are allowed during the
experiment. Thank you!
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Figure 1: Active task: Gain condition
Figure 2: Active task: Loss condition
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Figure 5: Correlation between the size of probability estimation errors and the number
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Difference in probability errors is significantly greater than 0 (p<0.05).
Figure 8: Left: Average probability estimation errors are significantly higher for the 42
participants with a low finance knowledge score (i.e., those who made at least one mistake
when answering the portfolio return question asked after the experimental task), relative to
the 45 participants with a high finance knowledge score (i.e., those who made no mistake
answering the portfolio return question). Right: Average probability estimation errors are
significantly higher for the 68 participants with other variants of the COMT genotype,
relative to the 19 participants who have the Met/Met genotype. These differences are
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Difference in number of optimal choices is significantly less than 0 (p<0.05).
Figure 9: Left: The average number of optimal choices is significantly lower for the 42
participants with a low finance knowledge score (i.e., those who made at least one mistake
when answering the portfolio return question asked after the experimental task), relative to
the 45 participants with a high finance knowledge score (i.e., those who made no mistake
answering the portfolio return question). Right: The average number of optimal choices is
significantly lower for the 68 participants with other variants of the COMT genotype, relative
to the 19 participants who have the Met/Met genotype. These differences are significant at
conventional levels (p < 0.05).
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Financial COMT
Gender Age (years) Ethnicity knowledge genotype
Male: 37 Mean: 20 Caucasian:44 Score of 3: 45 Met/Met: 19
Female: 50 St. Dev.: 1.6 Asian: 20 Score of 2: 24 V al/Met: 34
Range: 18-29 African-American: 8 Score of 1: 17 V al/V al: 34
Indian: 8 Score of 0: 1
Hispanic: 7
N = 87 participants
Table 2: Probability estimation errors and their dependence on context and type of informa-
tion received. The dependent variable in these OLS regressions is the absolute value of the
probability estimation error made by participant i in a given trial t (i.e., the absolute value
of the difference between the subjective probability estimate and the objective Bayesian
probability that the stock pays dividends from the better distribution, given the information
seen so far by the participant). Constant term included, omitted here for brevity. Robust
standard errors are clustered by subject.
Dependent
variable Absolute Probability Errorit
Trials with
Active Passive Gain Loss objective
All trials trials All trials trials posteriors
trials only only trials only only ≥ 50%
Loss trialit 1.86 2.56 1.16 4.31
(3.88)∗∗∗ (3.95)∗∗∗ (1.83)∗ (6.71)∗∗∗
Passive trialit –1.06 –0.36 –1.76
(–1.72)∗ (–0.51) (–2.23)∗∗
Adj. R2 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.02
Observations 10377 5177 5200 10377 5193 5184 5938
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Table 3: Distribution of learner types. Each participant is assigned to one of the four types
below, based on whether their average of the absolute values of probability errors committed
is higher in the Loss condition vs. the Gain condition, or in the Active vs. Passive trials.
For example, the table shows that 36 out of 87 participants (i.e., 41%), learn worse during
Loss and during Active trials, relative to the other types of trials.
Number of participants
Worse learning in Worse learning in
Loss trials Gain trials
Worse learning in 36 18 Total: 54
Active trials (41%) (21%)
Worse learning in 21 12 Total: 33
Passive trials (24%) (14%)
Total: 57 Total: 30 Overall: 87
Table 4: Heterogeneity of learning performance across different conditions.
Standard Deviation of Absolute Probability Errors
Loss condition 15.85% Active trials 15.45%
Gain condition 13.99% Passive trials 14.39%
Difference 1.86%∗∗∗ Difference 1.06%∗∗
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Table 5: Predictors of learning errors. The dependent variable in these OLS regressions is the absolute value of the probability
estimation error (expressed as percentage points) made by participant i in a given trial t. Ethnicity fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by participant.
Dependent variable Absolute Probability Errorit
Active Passive Gain Loss Loss, high
All All trials trials trials trials prior (≥ 50%)
trials trials only only only only trials only
COMT Met/Meti –2.34 –1.87 –2.85 –2.19 –2.61 –4.88
(–2.01)∗∗ (–1.66)∗ (–1.98)∗ (–2.00)∗∗ (–1.91)∗ (–2.40)∗∗
Finance Knowledgei –1.83 –1.67 –1.41 –1.96 –1.46 –1.85 –1.39
(–2.43)∗∗ (–2.24)∗∗ (–2.13)∗∗ (–1.99)∗∗ (–2.19)∗∗ (–1.91)∗ (–1.23)
Malei –1.49 –1.62 –2.60 –0.57 –1.59 –2.06 –4.36
(–1.35) (–1.48) (–2.27)∗∗ (–0.41) (–1.43) (–1.61) (–2.24)∗∗
Agei 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.39 0.29 0.27 0.77
(0.78) (0.75) (0.36) (0.87) (0.87) (0.66) (1.10)
ObjectiveProbabilityi,t−1 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 –0.01 0.09 0.29
(3.15)∗∗∗ (3.20)∗∗∗ (3.77)∗∗∗ (1.32) (–0.62) (5.08)∗∗∗ (5.25)∗∗∗
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.031 0.050 0.069
Observations 10377 10377 5177 5200 5193 5184 1848
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